Big news today in Finland & Sweden: Finnish parliamentarians informed their Swedish colleagues during a visit that Finland will start drafting the required laws for NATO accession, making it more likely that 🇫🇮 would become member without 🇸🇪 if 🇹🇷&🇭🇺 ratify separately
This comes after NATO GenSec Jens Stoltenberg said today that it’s not so important whether 🇫🇮&🇸🇪 enter the Alliance at the same time, but that they become members asap. This marks a change in tone
However, 🇫🇮 parliament’s foreign affairs committee’s chairperson Jussi Halla-Aho said that there is no unanimous answer within the committee to the question how Finland would proceed in case it was ratified without Sweden hs.fi/politiikka/art…
It isn’t quite the defcon level as portrayed in Swedish media. It was anyways going to be the most likely scenario in which 🇫🇮 would go ahead, if 🇫🇮 was ratified alone but without actively seeking to separate the processes
This should in general hardly come as a surprise - in his typically cryptic way, 🇫🇮 President Niinistö already nudged the parliament to start preparing the necessary legislation in his New Year’s speech. And the Pres is the security policy influencer no 1
What 🇸🇪 parliament’s foreign affairs committee’s vice chair Morgan Johansson says here isn’t quite accurate - at least for 🇫🇮 the point of NATO membership is maximum deterrence, not developing bilateral defence coop with 🇸🇪 (which is very important too)
Finally, it feels pretty tactless to go on about this while Turkey is still grappling with the devastating consequences of the earthquake and more than 30k dead. This could also change Erdogan’s domestic situation, and possibly have an impact on the election schedule
Possibly the NATO issue will lose some of its relevance as a tool for Erdogan; whether it’ll lead to a quiet ratification I can’t assess. But both Erdogan & the rest of the country currently have other more pressing issues to deal with so further delay could be possible too.
To conclude: in Finland the consensus is that joint accession remains priority but esp with elections in April, 🇫🇮 wants to avoid any potential delay in the process when the new govt & parliament are being formed, should the pending ratifications come in later in the spring
Having followed the 🇫🇮🇸🇪 process closely, I have to say it has also revealed quite a notable lack of understanding of 🇫🇮 sec pol in 🇸🇪: that 🇸🇪 was so surprised by 🇫🇮 decision to join NATO last spring (“jävla finnar, nu måste vi kanske också gå med”)… svd.se/a/Qy1gXx/sa-gi…
…and that until Jan this year, hardly anyone in Sweden seemed to have thought of the possibility of 🇫🇮 going ahead alone, despite an opinion poll from Nov already indicating that 52% of respondents said 🇫🇮 should not wait for 🇸🇪 mtvuutiset.fi/artikkeli/mtv-…
It’s great that the NATO process has brought 🇫🇮&🇸🇪 closer and fostered an even better mutual understanding, and apparently made Swedes think more positively about Finland.
I trust the bffs to handle this elegantly and without hard feelings. 🇫🇮🫶🇸🇪
Ich hoffe sehr, dass sich das Denken und der Ton in Deutschland nach dem Ampel-Aus ändert, was eine Lösung für die Ukraine angeht.
Die Berichte über die Idee eines „finnischen Modells“ der Neutralität wie im kalten Krieg wurden in Finnland mit großer Bestürzung aufgenommen.
In diesem Thread sammle ich die wichtigsten Reaktionen auf höchster politischer und medialer Ebene. Ich will damit nichts anderes bezwecken, als dass deutsche Entscheidungsträger*innen und Medienvertreter*innen hoffentlich verstehen, wie schlecht das aufgenommen wurde.
Am 5.11. kommentierte der finnische Präsident @alexstubb kurz und knapp: „die Antwort an alle, die solche Ideen vorschlagen, lautet: vergesst es“.
I am incredibly lucky to know many senior people in my field of work whose experience and insights I greatly value, them having witnessed the world transition from the Cold War to what came after it.
But I think there’s value also in lacking that experience.
If you lived through the Cold War, you appreciate in a different way how far we have come since, say, the CSCE Helsinki Final Act in 1975 in terms of self-determination of peoples and respect for sovereignty of states whatever their size.
But there’s also value in taking all that for granted.
If you, like my generation of Europeans, grew up in a post-Cold War united Europe where national borders had become increasingly irrelevant thanks to European integration, your standards are in a way higher.
The whole thread leaves me simply speechless. It’s utterly incredible to me that the Finlandisation idea would make a comeback in any serious conversation especially AFTER Finland itself joined NATO and by doing so made it clear that non-alignment wasn’t an option anymore
If one thing is clear about the changes needed in a new or at least adapted European security order, it is that spaces for neutrality are almost nonexistent.
Neutrality a la Finland was never an option for Ukraine for several reasons:
1) Ukraine is much higher on Putin’s obsession scale than Finland ever was, and Ukraine is also much more important than Finland. It was partly luck that Finlandisation worked, as the Soviet Union didn’t deem the benefits to overweight the costs of trying to subjugate Finland.
Taking stock of 2,5+ years of Russia’s war against Ukraine:
- Western leaders have successfully avoided nuclear war
- but made the war in Ukraine a world-order changing event, which it didn’t necessarily have to be
- and made nuclear proliferation more likely in the future
The West’s incremental strategy has enabled Russia to gather support from China, North Korea and Iran who were more hesitant in the beginning. They are now building the BRICS+ alternative, which can become serious competition to the western-led international order.
Thanks to this dynamic, both Iran and North Korea are less isolated now than pre-2022. Iran might very well reconsider the costs (which seem pretty low) and benefits (which seem high, given that Russia was able to coerce the West into indecision) of crossing the nuclear threshold
Takes on Finlandisation and its post-Cold War legacy are almost exclusively bad. Labelling it as “diplo-nonsense to appease the USSR” is as mistaken as romanticising it as some kind of stroke of genius that could be exported to any other country with a Russia problem.
The only mind-boggling aspect of this is that things many Finns privately thought are now within the limits of political correctness to be said out loud.
The gist of Finlandisation was that there was a thin, performative official truth but the reality was often the opposite.
Finland was to an extent a victim of its own success, as the thin official truth had to be convincing enough to the Soviet Union. External western observers only saw the official truth and believed it to be the full truth. Pretty cringe sometimes to read literature from the time.
This is what I feared. I had hoped that things changed in the past 80 years and supporting Ukraine’s defence TO THE FULLEST would be a no brainer. But the western incremental strategy to keep Ukraine afloat but not more was bound to lead to this disillusionment & loss of trust.
The consequences of having generations of Ukrainians who remember how we, in fact, did NOT stand with Ukraine in their hour of need will be devastating. And I don’t think western leaders appreciate it enough what a powder keg this might create, if we end up failing Ukraine fully
Sorry to be the cliche Finn and to go on about the Winter War, but the trauma of having been left alone then just sits so deep.
Just this week it was announced that Sweden will be the framework nation for Finland’s NATO FLF and people are like, ok but can we trust them now